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DISCOMFITURE OF DEMOCRACY? 
THE 2005 ELECTION CRISIS IN ETHIOPIA 
AND ITS AFTERMATH
J. ABBINK
ABSTRACT
In this article, I assess the nature and the impact of the May 2005
Ethiopian parliamentary elections on Ethiopian politics. The elections,
although controversial and flawed, showed significant gains for the
opposition but led to a crisis of the entire democratization process. I
revisit Ethiopian political culture in the light of neo-patrimonial theory
and ask why the political system has stagnated and slid back into authori-
tarianism. Most analyses of post-1991 Ethiopian politics discuss the
formal aspects of the political system but do not deal sufficiently with
power politics in a historical perspective. There is a continued need to
reconceptualize the analysis of politics in Ethiopia, and Africa in general,
in more cultural and historical terms, away from the formal political sci-
ence approaches that have predominated. The success of transitional
democracy is also dependent on a countervailing middle class, which is
suppressed in Ethiopia. Also, political–judicial institutions are still precar-
ious, and their operation is dependent on the current political elite and
caught in the politics of the dominant (ruling) party. All these refer back
to the historically engrained authoritarian/hierarchical tradition in Ethio-
pian politics. On the basis of the electoral process, the post-election
manoeuvring, the role of opposition forces, and the violent crisis in late
2005, I address the Ethiopian political process in the light of governance
traditions and of resurrected neo-patrimonial rule that, in effect, tend to
block further democratization.
THIS ARTICLE discusses the contested Ethiopian parliamentary elections of
May 2005 and their aftermath and assesses the wider implications of the
ensuing crisis in the country’s political system. Although indicative of sig-
nificant shifts in voters’ preferences towards new opposition parties, the
authoritarian political tradition in Ethiopia asserted itself again in the
reluctance of the incumbent government to allow re-elections in contested
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constituencies or to hold dialogue with opposition groups, in rigid responses
on the part of the opposition, and in violent repression of post-election dis-
sent and mass arrests of perceived opponents. The elections were a step
forward but did not signify a decisive, non-reversible move towards demo-
cracy because of the uncertainty about the counting procedures, the real
results, and the controversial government response. Not only Ethiopian
public, but also donor countries, and development partners, who invested
a lot in the ‘Ethiopian example’, were greatly disillusioned. The 2005
elections and their aftermath thus revealed major constraints in Ethiopia’s
political system, underlining that after the regimes of Emperor Haile
Sellassie (1930–74) and the military leader Mengistu (1974–91), central-
ist authoritarianism is not gone but perhaps is being reinvented in a new
form.
There is no doubt that post-1991 Ethiopia saw significant political insti-
tution building and that a public ethos of democracy emerged. But the
process is still closely controlled by the ruling Tigray People’s Libera-
tion Front–Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (TPLF–
EPRDF), and has a high ingredient of rhetoric not backed by practice. In
conditions of political insecurity and contested legitimacy, a network of
political and economic control was built up by this party from its circle of
trusted people, loyalists, and former comrades in the armed struggle. Thus,
a selective hold on politics and economics in Ethiopia was established. There
is a new, party-affiliated business class, and the non-party-affiliated busi-
ness people regularly complain of unfair and non-transparent competition
and preferential treatment. Most of the political decision-making seems to
occur outside the cabinet of ministers and the parliament, as is evident at
crucial moments. This informal, behind-the-scenes politics is nothing sur-
prising in the Ethiopian, or wider African, context and is perhaps inevitable
in a contested and risky political arena. It implies, however, that the dura-
ble constraints still in place within the political system have inhibited the
development of a formal democratic structure that might lead to political
power transfer.
As G. Gill has noted,1 it is important to analyse ‘transitions’ to demo-
cracy not only with a focus on the role of political actors and elites but
also taking into account a wider array of social forces, for example class
power, civil society groups, the stature and power (capacity) of the state,
and transnational power connections. His study does not refer to African
cases, but his model might be applied there as well. Since the mid-1980s,
various related theoretical approaches have emerged to explain African politics
and its problems: from the study of government and institutions, rational
1. G. Gill, The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, civil society and the transition process
(Macmillan Press, London, 2000).
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choice,2 and neo-patrimonialism3 to that of governance and regime transi-
tion.4 In recent years, there is more eye for the diversity, fragmentation,
and conflictual nature of state and politics in Africa, as well as for social
stratification, factors producing collapsed or failed states,5 and ‘govern-
mentality’ in a more historical and cultural sense.6 Still relevant is the
theory of neo-patrimonialism, which in Médard’s definition (1996)
emphasizes the specific link between the nominal features of a bureau-
cratic-legal state structure with personalized, ‘traditionalist’ forms of dom-
ination, via clientelistic networks and loyalties of ethnicity and kinship.
But this perspective, which addresses durable features of African political
systems often only reluctantly admitted, must be extended by giving more
attention to politics as an arena of pluralist values and conflicting repre-
sentations and practices of power.7 Finally, following Gill,8 the nature and
range of civil society and the role of the business class in a country in ‘tran-
sition’ are to be taken into account.
The meaning of elections in Ethiopia
For comparative political scientists and political anthropologists, study-
ing elections is a good entry point to explore the nature of politics and
political manipulation in Africa. Elections have figured prominently in recent
studies of ‘democratic transition’. A discussion of the 2005 elections in
Ethiopia and their aftermath must refer to the wider political and historical
2. R.H. Bates, Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1983); R.H. Bates (ed.), Towards a Political Economy of Development: A rational
choice perspective (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1998).
3. J.-F. Médard (ed.), ‘L’État néo-patrimonial en Afrique noire’, in États d’afrique Noire:
Formations, mécanismes et crise (Karthala, Paris, 1991), pp. 323–53. J.-F. Médard, ‘Patrimoni-
alism, neo-patrimonialism and the study of the post-colonial state in Subsaharan Africa’, in
H.S. Marcussen (ed.), Improved Natural Resource Management: – the role of formal organisations
and informal networks and institutions (Roskilde University, Institute of International Develop-
ment Studies, Roskilde, 1996), pp. 76–97. M. Bratton and N. Van de Walle, Neopatrimonial
regimes and political transitions in Africa, World Politics 46, 4 (1994), pp. 453–89.
4. G. Hyden and M. Bratton, Governance and Politics in Africa (Lynne Rienner, Boulder,
CO, 1991); M. Bratton and N. van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime transi-
tions in comparative perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997).
5. P. Chabal and J.-P. Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as political instrument (Indiana University
Press, Bloomington, and James Currey, Oxford, 1999); J. Milliken (ed.), ‘State failure, col-
lapse and reconstruction’, Development and Change 33, 5 (2002), [Special issue].
6. For example, D.L. Donham, Marxist Modern: An ethnographic history of the Ethiopian
revolution (University of California Press, Berkeley, and James Currey, Oxford, 1999);
M. Karlström, ‘Imagining democracy: political culture and democratization in Buganda’,
Africa 66, 4 (1996), pp. 485–505; M. Okema, Political Culture in Tanzania (Edwin Mellen
Press, Lewiston, NY, 1996).
7. K.F. Hansen, ‘The politics of personal relations: beyond neopatrimonial practices in
northern Cameroon’, Africa 73, 2 (2003), pp. 202–25; G. Erdmann and U. Engel, ‘Neopatri-
monialism reconsidered — critical review and elaboration of an elusive concept’, paper pre-
sented at the 45th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Washington, DC, 4–8
December 2002.
8. Gill, Dynamics of Democratization.
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context and view the post-election political crisis with a longer term per-
spective that incorporates the country’s political culture. After introductory
sections on context and history, I start with a brief overview of what hap-
pened during and after the 2005 elections, a subject on which dispassion-
ate analyses are rare.
The Ethiopian parliamentary elections of May 2005 were the most con-
tested ever. Preceded by a relatively free and open public debate between
the dominant party and the opposition parties, as well as by more wide-
spread campaigning in the countryside than hitherto, they generated an
atmosphere of hope and dynamism. But they ended in sharp disagreement,
controversy, and massive repression of popular protest in the post-election
phase. Opposition parties claimed to have won but to have been denied
victory because of rigging, and when their demands for new elections in
contested constituencies were rejected, they called for demonstrations.
A period of instability and violence began, leading to the killing of doz-
ens of people and the arrest of tens of thousands of alleged opponents and
protesters and the suppression of civil society groups. Political dialogue
between the governing party and opposition forces, mediated by European
Union (EU) diplomats, was aborted; concessions to the opposition, which
had indeed won substantially, were refused. Political deadlock followed
and disillusion came to reign in the mind of the public.9 In late October,
the leading opposition party CUD boycotted entry into the new parliament
and announced a round of peaceful demonstrations and boycotts, which
were countered by a new round of violent suppression by police and Special
Forces. As of early December 2005, the CUD opposition still refused to
take up its new seats in parliament — and by then, its leaders were physi-
cally incapable of doing so because they were all in jail. Protests continued.
The government chose to see all protests as a ‘law-and-order’ problem and
took measures to forcefully suppress them.
The setback of this ‘process of democratization’, announced by the
EPRDF regime after taking power in May 1991 and still publicly affirmed,
can be explained with reference to the nature of elite rule, Ethiopian polit-
ical tradition, the weaknesses of civil society, and the lack of a countervail-
ing middle class in Ethiopia. In what follows, I briefly revisit Ethiopian
political culture in the light of neo-patrimonial theory, thereby emphasiz-
ing the continued need to reconceptualize the analysis of politics in Ethio-
pia, away from the formal political science approaches predominating so
far, towards a view of politics in more cultural terms, taking into account
ethnic/kinship networks, local conceptions and psychologies of power, the
role of ideology, and (informal) business interests.
9. See R. Crilly, ‘Feeling is not good after Ethiopia vote’, USA Today, 2 July 2005 <http://
www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-07-20-ethiopia_x.htm> (20 October 2005).
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Many analyses of Ethiopian politics after 1991 emphasized the formal
political reforms10 and the new federal system and its constitution11 and
discussed the parties and liberation movements,12 the two-chamber parlia-
ment, the reforms in the legal system, and so on. These formal institutions
and actors are precarious and embedded in other power contexts, depend-
ent on forceful personal action and informal power networks behind the
façade. Donor-country diplomats, especially, are charmed by this formal
façade of Ethiopian politics and always place high hopes in the promises
offered by the political leadership. When asked about the political state of
play in Ethiopia, they point to the improvements in the sphere of parties,
the legal framework or the media, the reduced level of public violence, the
absence of civil war, the relative scarcity of random killings and abductions
of opponents, the prudent macro-economic policy, and the liberalization of
the economy and the political system. In this, the despised Derg dictator-
ship (1974–91), and perhaps the disarray in neighbouring Somalia, is still
the measure. This approach tends to underestimate the authoritarian patri-
monialized system in place. This limits democratization and reform and, in
effect, tends to perpetuate the rule of a party and an elite that cannot afford
to relinquish hard-earned power. One can even historically understand this
point: the ruling party — that emanated from the successful TPLF insur-
gent movement — came to power with the force of arms, its members sac-
rificing a lot during the insurgency (1975–91). Their political-economic
stakes are now great. Many people in positions of power from the federal
level in Addis Ababa to the k’ebele (local community) level are appointed
because of loyalty to the party; they have income, privileges, and jobs to
lose and will not voluntarily give them up, because unemployment, insecu-
rity, or poverty is waiting.13 An old saying in Ethiopia is: ‘He who does not
“eat” while in power, will regret it when he is out’. This still holds. So next
to substantial ideological differences and a conception of power as a cher-
ished prize and as indivisible, there is a deep economic, if not survival,
logic behind the political process in Ethiopia. The state resembles a
10. T.S. Lyons, ‘Closing the transition: the May 1995 elections in Ethiopia’, Journal of
Modern African Studies 34, 1 (1996), pp. 121–42.
11. A.M. Abdullahi, ‘Article 39 of the Ethiopian constitution on secession and self-determination:
a panacea to the nationality question in Africa?’, Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 31, 4 (1998),
pp. 440–55; Kidane Mengisteab, ‘Ethiopia’s ethnic-based federalism: 10 years after’, African
Issues 19, 1–2 (2002), pp. 20–6.
12. S.F. Joireman, ‘Opposition politics and ethnicity in Ethiopia: “we will all go down
together” ’, Journal of Modern African Studies 35, 3 (1997), pp. 387–407; Medhane Tadesse
and J. Young, ‘TPLF: reform or decline?’, Review of African Political Economy 30, 97 (2003),
pp. 389–403.
13. After May 1991, the EPRDF quickly moved to take over key sectors of the Ethiopian
economy. This was a quite successful operation. Large business conglomerates are now
headed by prominent party members or their associates/relatives. A first — anonymous —
report that inventoried the take-over in detail was ‘Ethiopian Non-Governmental Businesses,
A Preliminary Survey’ (Addis Ababa, 1996, unpublished, 56 pp.). The new patronage net-
works draw heavy criticism from the disadvantaged non-party-affiliated business people.
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domain of personalized power and resource competition through the
instrumentalization of vertical loyalties among special, strategic constituen-
cies. Resource competition, although not explaining all, goes a long way in
accounting for Ethiopia’s exclusivist and conflictual political dynamics.14 It
must be said that the TPLF–EPRDF has done much to realize economic
reforms in Ethiopia but did not complete its political agenda,15 which
included entrenching power and transforming Ethiopian political culture
(towards ethnic politics), social structure (neutralization of interest groups
based on private business, or ‘narrow nationalist’ regional identities), and
public mentalities (eliminating, or at least containing, the influence of reli-
gion in public life, balancing and co-opting Christianity and Islam, and
inculcating ethnic consciousness).
Although the 2005 elections are only one ephemeral moment in Ethio-
pia’s political development, what happened on this occasion is illustrative
of certain relatively unchanging structures and notions in Ethiopian polit-
ics. There are two theoretical points here: first, a focus on formal politics is
misleading. In Ethiopia, where institutional reforms and a process of polit-
ical liberalization began in earnest after 1991, the vital political decisions
are made in the informal sphere, behind the façade, in circles and networks
of a neo-patrimonialist nature, impervious to what institutions like a parlia-
ment or a high court say. Although one can fault the neo-patrimonialist
paradigm for its somewhat biased and limited view on the political process
in African states (cf. Therkildsen 2005 for a recent critique), its core idea
— following Médard (1996) — of the combination of semi-bureaucratic and
patrimonial logics in one personalized political system is still a fruitful
point of departure, especially in a country where ethnic and cultural soli-
darities are important, even formative, to the cohesiveness of the political
elite. Second, Ethiopian political struggles and power politics reflect the
peculiarities of social structure, notably the lack of a strong, economically
rooted middle class and a corresponding, independent, civil society that
can be a countervailing force to the dominant party or government.
Although a civil society has been emerging slowly in the past 15 years, it
was dealt a blow by the current regime before and after the May 2005 elec-
tions (A core issue is the perpetual onslaught on property rights, of which
no one can ever be legally sure). This seems to support Gill’s analysis,16
which emphasizes the vital role that civil society organizations, next to
14. A recent study by two Ethiopian researchers has underlined that Ethiopia is a signifi-
cantly ‘conflict-prone’ country, where ‘... new regimes have failed to learn the lessons of their
predecessors’: Alemayehu Geda and Befekadu Degefe,‘Conflict, post-conflict and economic
performance in Ethiopia’, in A.K. Fosu and P. Collier (eds), Post-Conflict Economies in Africa
(Palgrave-Macmillan, New York, 2005), p. 138.
15. For a basic statement of this, see ‘Our revolutionary goals and the next steps’, Amharic
document for TPLF members, June 1993 [translated version in Ethiopian Register 3, 6 (1993),
pp. 20–9].
16. Gill, Dynamics of Democratization.
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elites and institutional structures, must play in a successful democratic
transition. In the Ethiopian countryside, there are even fewer power groups
or strata than in the towns and cities, because of state ownership of all
land, periodically redistributed to uproot possible interest groups or entre-
preneurs and keep the peasantry dependent.
Context and background
Ethiopia is an important African country, with a relatively strong and
functional administrative machinery and a well-organized army. It is poor
and economically underdeveloped but still the major player in the Horn of
Africa, with a population of some 77 million people17 — more than that of
its four Horn neighbours (Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti) com-
bined. Political and regime stability is a major concern both among donor
countries (mainly the United States, EU, Japan, and China) and among
the EPRDF elite in the country itself. Ethiopia is a recipient of compara-
tively large sums of donor funds. In this context, the current leadership of
Ethiopia has effectively tuned in to the donor discourse of liberalization
and democratization.
The ruling party EPRDF took power in 1991 amidst a surge of relief and
cautious optimism after the civil war and the devastating Derg regime. To
some observers, notably donor-affiliated ones, it appeared puzzling why,
despite the promises and the new start, the Ethiopian regime did not, after
15 years in power, make a decisive breakthrough to a democratic politics
based on compromise strategies and a wide national agenda. This
approach ignores the history and nature of the insurgent movement TPLF/
EPRDF that came to power via the familiar route of military action, based
on forceful mobilization of a rural constituency and a rather sectarian ide-
ology. It has not been successful in consolidating the initial momentum
and establishing nationwide acceptance. In the political system as reshaped
after 1991, public trust is lacking. This ‘commodity’, facilitating political
communication and establishing a measure of predictability and a will to
overcome differences in a shared political arena, is a prerequisite in the
complex arena of Ethiopian politics. In the 2005 election period, the lack
of trust — in the government, the fairness of the counting, the political
negotiation process, national issue politics, and parts of the opposition —
has had serious consequences for politics in general but in particular for
the government and the EPRDF. Distrust and cynicism, although
engrained, were ignored by the ruling party before the elections because of
a wrong assessment of its own political record, its underestimation of the
17. United Nations Family Planning Association press release, 13 October 2005. The cur-
rent annual growth rate of at least 2.4 percent is high and undermines environmental recov-
ery, economic growth, and the realization of the Millennium Development Goals.
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desire for political space among the population, and the party’s biased and
generally poor economic achievements, notably in the rural areas. The
party’s own power base, buttressed by political-economic and military
clout, was in the rural north, in the Tigray trading class, and among peas-
ants, smaller ethnic minorities, and elites from various ethnic groups co-
opted into a parallel structure of ethnic parties in all regions. This constitu-
ency was not expected to show dissent, but it did. Notably the peasants of
the northern and western countryside and ethnic minorities started to vote
for alternative parties, despite the administrative and economic hold that
the ruling party was exercising.
As noted above, the ‘economics of scarcity’ that underlies much of African
politics is an explanatory element accounting for the reproduction of neo-
patrimonial tendencies. Also in Ethiopia, politics is a game where the
stakes are high18 and where the constituencies of the power holders insist
on their privileged access to resources and thus reject change towards more
equitable structures. Political power in the country is closely tied to mate-
rial and economic interests. In the imperial era, the land-holding class was
the basis of power, and the inequalities and economic stagnation in that
system contributed to the downfall of the emperor in 1974. The subse-
quent Derg regime, a Marxist junta led by army officers, nationalized all
land, abolished the imperial system, and followed a socialist development
model. But because of its dogmatic form of state socialism, repressive
domestic policy, and the crippling war with Eritrean and other rebel move-
ments, it did not succeed in achieving legitimacy, stability, or economic
growth. The ethno-regional insurgency of the TPLF–EPRDF (1975–91),
based in the northern Tigray region, toppled this regime in 1991, in com-
bination with the Eritrean resistance forces (Eritrean People’s Liberation
Front). The EPRDF elite fundamentally restructured the Ethiopian state,
redefined Ethiopia’s relation with independent Eritrea, and co-opted the
economy by bringing it largely under its own control. Despite liberalization
and economic growth in the formal sector, the problems of food insecurity,
public health, unemployment, urban poverty, disrespect of human rights,
and ethnic tensions were not resolved, and public dissatisfaction mounted.
This was despite the post-1991 agenda of democratizing the country, first
and foremost by giving ethno-linguistic groups more recognition and rights
and by working towards a parliamentary democracy with periodic elections
and a reformed judicial structure. The party leadership, however, seems
not prepared to implement it to the end and follows its own agenda.19 A
study of the electoral process is crucial in revealing the problems of Ethio-
pian politics and its relapse into centralist authoritarian tendencies.
18. Médard, ‘Patrimonialism, neo-patrimonialism’, p. 87.
19. This agenda is contained, for instance, in Abyotawi Demokrasi (‘Revolutionary Democ-
racy’), an about 700-page internal EPRDF ideological document, Addis Ababa 2001.
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Electoral preludes
The Ethiopian political process before the elections, observed and moni-
tored with high expectations by the donor-country community, showed an
unprecedented openness and dynamism before the voting day, 15 May
2005. Campaigning and publicity were better than in any preceding elec-
tion. The ruling party and the prime minister had reiterated their commit-
ment to further democratizing the country, and this generated incremental
expectations of change and power sharing. Before the election, important
debates were held on state television and in the written media, and pre-
election negotiations between the contenders had discussed procedures
and campaigning. There was some doubt whether the new space for cam-
paigning was a policy to which the regime was genuinely committed, or
whether it was primarily a gesture to answer donor-country pressure. It
also has to be noted that in these various debates and exchanges in the
media and in public meetings, no fundamental agreement on the core
political issues, or even on the basis of the Ethiopian state and its institu-
tions, was reached: deep divisions remained.20 There were also many
reports of disturbances to election meetings and of intimidation of and
violence against opposition members in the countryside,21 where several
people were killed.
A remarkable fact in 2004–5 was the quick growth to political promi-
nence and organizational skills of the new opposition parties — mainly
the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) – in Amharic Qinijit – and
the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) – in Amharic Hibrät.
The CUD was led by people from the urban middle class like Berhanu
Nega, a well-known economist, Mesfin Wolde-Mariam, an influential,
retired professor, Lidetu Ayalew, a politician of the young generation,
Hailu Shawel, a veteran businessman and former vice-minister, and
Yaqob Haile-Mariam, a respected international legal expert. The UEDF
was led by the veteran leaders and university lecturers Beyene P’etros and
Merera Gudina.
The social basis of the two large opposition parties was very diverse. The
UEDF emerged from a coalition of largely ethnic-based opposition groups
(SEPDC, ONC, ARDUF, etc.) that had emerged after 1991 in the south
and west of the country, representing, for example, Hadiya, Kambata,
Gurage, Oromo, Gamo and many smaller groups, and members of these
groups in the urban areas. It also includes parties with a largely diaspora
following. The CUD is a coalition of four parties with a largely urban and
20. See Yitzhak Kiflegzie, ‘Bereket’s harassment as “political” debate’, The Reporter (Addis
Ababa), 19 March 2005.
21. See reports in the local Ethiopian press: Dagim-Wonch’if, 29 March 2005; T’obbia, 14
April 2005; T’omar, 13 April 2005; Reporter, 17 April 2005; Seife-Näbälbal, 21 April 2005.
Sea also the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, 80th Special Report, 19 October 2004.
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business-class constituency — civil servants, teachers, professionals, uni-
versity lecturers, traders, shopkeepers, and others, but with a growing fol-
lowing among ordinary people and in rural areas in central, western, and
northern Ethiopia. CUD’s growth within one year of its merger in 2004 is
to be explained, next to the appeal of its leaders, by the profound disillu-
sion with EPRDF among the non-party-affiliated trading class and the
peasantry in the highlands.22 Compared to the UEDF, which is more eth-
nic-particularistic although committed to an agenda giving space to all eth-
nic groups within the state, the CUD is more nationally oriented, adhering
to a pan-ethnic programme aimed at issue politics and for liberalized, equi-
table economic development.
In general, the new opposition parties reflected the public impatience
and dissatisfaction with the government’s record and people’s clamour for
change.23 Although the government cannot be blamed for all the problems
facing the country, a general attitude of malaise and often cynicism was
notable among the wider public regarding the economy (agricultural stag-
nation, food insecurity, corruption, and nepotism), health care (growing
AIDS and TB infection rates and shabby state of the health infrastructure),
foreign policy (especially towards Eritrea), and the perceived lack of gov-
ernment transparency and policy predictability in general. The opposition
parties stressed an alternative, national, pan-regionalist, and pan-religious
agenda, and — especially the CUD — expressed scepticism about the
ethnic-federalist model, the land policy, the Eritrea question, and eco-
nomic policies.
Although lauded by observers as relatively open and competitive, the pre-
election period, as mentioned above, was not free of violence and intimida-
tion. The atmosphere was always very tense under the surface. In an Ethio-
pian TV address on 5 May 2005, Ethiopia’s prime minister heightened the
tension with a speech saying that the opposition was ‘fomenting ethnic
hatred that could erupt into violence’.24 He raised the image of the violent
Rwandan Interahamwe militia as something that the opposition might
emulate.25 This was a new element, because up to that point there had been
22. Some observers were quick to label the CUD as ‘Amhara chauvinists’, an incorrect and
rather mischievous qualification, reflecting the wish to ethnicize Ethiopian politics. No doubt
some entered the CUD as representatives of the Amhara/Amharic-speaking people, but the
party’s political agenda was national, not ethnic.
23. See, for instance, a report of PINR (an independent US-based research institution),
‘Intelligence Brief: Ethiopia’, PINR, 25 October 2005 <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=
view_report&report_id=387&language_id=1>.
24. See ‘Ethiopia — Zenawi accuses opposition of agitating for poll violence’, AFP, 6 May
2005 [Also in the Sudan Tribune: <http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=9432>
(23 October 2005)].
25. A reference called ‘ridiculous’ in the article ‘Ethiopia: a taste of democracy’, The Econo-
mist, 19 May 2005 <http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3996217> (15
October 2005).
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no talk in the campaign of ethnicity as such, despite the fact that all parties
had some major ethno-regional constituency from which they drew support.
In April 2005, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) had disal-
lowed some 30 local non-governmental organizations to act as observers. An
order of the Ethiopian High Court later reversed the decision, but by then it
was too late for them to enter the observation process. As these local NGOs
knew the situation on the ground very well and could have made a major con-
tribution; their absence was a significant setback for the election process.
Elections and their setting
The 15 May 2005 elections were the third multiparty parliamentary elec-
tions since 1991 and were arguably the most significant and eventful round
of voting in Ethiopia so far.26 Registration was very high, and voter turnout
was about 80 to 90 percent. People felt that change was possible, and they
were prepared to stand in line for many hours. This in itself was a big gain
for democracy in the country. Previous occasions in 1995 and 200027 were
much more controlled by the ruling party EPRDF, to such an extent that in
those elections ‘free-and-fair’ voting could not be fully realized.
Preceded by months of argument and contestation, the final results of
the count (including the delayed one from the Somali region) were pub-
lished on 5 September 2005. But already on 17 May, Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi announced an ‘overwhelming victory’ for his party, the
EPRDF: a remarkable observation to make two days after election day
with little counting done.28 But indeed, in the end the dominant party was
again confirmed in power. The EPRDF officially gained 371 seats (or 67.8
percent of the vote), as against 174 for the combined opposition parties,
from a total of 547 contested seats in the parliament.29 The UEDF won 52
and the CUD 109. These two opposition parties conquered the seats in
virtually all towns and urban areas, most notably in Addis Ababa.
26. There were parallel elections for the regional houses of parliament. For results, see the
National Electoral Board of Ethiopia website <http://www.electionsethiopia.org/PDF/results/
Regional%20Council%20Summary.pdf> (23 September 2005). In these regional elections,
the dominant party EPRDF also carried most of the seats. In Tigray, the seats were all for the
TPLF. In the Addis Ababa region, the opposition party ‘Qinijit’ (CUD) won all 138 seats
except one. Because of the unresolved post-election crisis, the CUD has not yet taken over
the city’s administration as of January 2006. They are now prevented from doing so, because
in the November 2005 crisis the entire leadership was thrown in jail. It is possible that the
government will, by procedural changes and stalling, block the CUD take-over of the capital’s
administration.
27. S. Pausewang, K. Tronvoll, and L. Aalen (eds), Ethiopia since the Derg: A decade of demo-
cratic pretension and performance (Zed Press, London, 2002).
28. See the Ethiopian weekly The Reporter, 18 May 2005.
29. See National Electoral Board of Ethiopia website <http://www.electionsethiopia.org/
Index.html> (23 September 2005). The final results were released some 3 and a half months
after the election date (5 September 2005).
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The result showed that the opposition parties made great gains, going
from 12 members in the previous parliament to 174 now. Despite their
successes, the opposition parties were dissatisfied and already during the
counting process appealed for re-votes in many constituencies where irreg-
ularities had allegedly occurred. They were supported in this assessment by
most international observers. The ruling party EPRDF — which had never
any doubt about winning, and in fact could not imagine losing — got a
great scare during the initial vote-counting process and tried to stem the
tide of loss. The counting was quite tortuous and delayed by many weeks.
The EU Observer Mission had already expressed its worry about the
counting process in a statement 24 May: 
The European Union Election Observation Mission regrets the way in which the
counting of the votes at the constituency level is being conducted as well as the way in
which the release of results is being handled by the electoral authorities, the govern-
ment and the political parties, especially the EPRDF.
The immediate post-election period was thus one of enormous
controversy and acrimonious debate between the protagonists and of
non-transparent manipulation with the vote counting (Smidt, W. G. C.,
‘Parlamentswahlen in Äthiopien’, Afrika Spektrum 40, 2 (2005), pp. 319–
30). Also the complaints investigation supervised by the government-
appointed NEBE was highly contested. The opposition accused the
NEBE of being biased towards the ruling party. Not only in Ethiopia
itself, but also in the Ethiopian diaspora communities, emotions ran
high and fierce accusations were traded on a daily basis in numerous
website discussions, which contributed to polarization.
Based on observer reports and oral information on incidents from voters,
it is no doubt the case that the elections were not perfect and that a large
number of constituencies had no fair electoral process. Not only were the
reports of local people complaining about military, cadre, and police intim-
idation too numerous to discount, but also foreign observers had criticism,
especially the EU (see below, p. 15). As to the vote-counting process,
opposition and EPRDF disputed 299 constituencies to the NEBE as dis-
puted.30 But after the complaints review, only 39 were accorded a rerun.
The freeness and fairness of these re-elections could not be assessed. Sur-
prisingly, several leading but quite unpopular regime members defeated in
the first election round were reinstated after re-elections in their constitu-
ency. Among them were former OPDO chief Kuma Demeqsa, Defence
Minister Abadula Gemeda, Information Minister Bereket Simon, and OPDO
chairman Juneddin Saddo. Reports from these re-elections mention
30. Quite a number of the constituencies disputed by the CUD (the large majority of them)
seemed to have been contested on less than convincing grounds. EPRDF disputed 70 of the
299 seats.
DISCOMFITURE OF DEMOCRACY? 185
intimidation of voters and the ‘disappearance’ of ballot boxes on their way
to the counting office. Many reruns of the vote were therefore even more
controversial than the first round. One reason, apart from intimidation of
rural people, is that both voting and vote counting require supervision by a
strictly neutral electoral board and observers, but indications were that
NEBE was not immune to government interference.
In October 2005, Zenawi was returned, with a trusted group of ministers
and advisors (state ministers), and Ethiopia entered another five years of
EPRDF rule.31 The outgoing government quickly changed some parlia-
mentary rules to minimize the impact of the opposition in the parliament,
should they take up their seats. The most important change was a rule that
required 51 percent of the parliamentarians to support an initiative before
it could appear on the House’s agenda. Previously, it was 20 percent.32
Also introduced was a rule to remove from parliament MPs using ‘insult-
ing and defamatory language’.
Backlash: repressive measures and political closure
As the vote counting unfolded from 15 May onwards and the opposi-
tion appeared to have performed well, even claiming prematurely to have
won the elections, the ruling party took measures to calm the situation
and reassert control. A ban on public demonstrations was declared for a
month after the voting day, a state media campaign was started to accuse
the opposition of disloyalty, and journalists were arrested. In what
seemed to be a campaign of punishment, in the countryside ruling party
politicians, cadres and police started harassing perceived opposition
opponents, of which thousands were arrested,33 and reportedly at least
one elected candidate for the parliament was shot and killed in unclear
circumstances.34
31. During one interview with the BBC’s Steven Sackur, in the programme ‘Hard Talk’,
4 July 2005 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/hardtalk/4649373.stm>, Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi had said, in response to a question on how long he would serve: ‘That’s up to
my party to decide’ and ‘... people have to stay as long as the people want them to stay, and
do so through freely-contested elections. The decision has to be that of the people in the final
analysis’.
32. It also changed rules for city revenue collection (e.g. from public transport) and budget
support for the Addis Ababa region, to be governed by the opposition CUD (Oxford Analyt-
ica report, ‘Ethiopia: boycott, protest threats heighten insecurity’, 23 September 2005). This
hampers the economic possibilities of the new administration — if it ever materializes — and
will in due course have residents shift the blame to the new city government.
33. See ‘Thousands arrested across Ethiopia in post-election crackdown’, Washington Post,
16 June 2005 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/15/AR20050
61502416.html> (24 July 2005).
34. This was Tesfaye Adane Gara in Arsi Neghele. His case is described in a documentary
Australian radio (‘Date line’) <http://news.sbs.com.au/dateline/index.php?page=tran-
script&dte=2005-08-24&headlineid=1013> (25 October 2005).
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In early June, Addis Ababa University students were the first to defy the
ban on demonstrations and staged a spontaneous sit-in strike on Monday, 4
June, to protest the arrest of students suspected of being CUD party support-
ers in the dormitories. They then protested ‘the stealing of the elections’ by
the ruling party. The federal police inflicted violence on this on-campus
protest, and next day when arrested students were driven past the Kotebe
Teachers’ College in army trucks, protests also started there and police
opened fire. One female student was killed.35 In the next two days, taxi driv-
ers began a strike, drawing severe threats and beatings from government
forces, and students in Bahir Dar, Awasa, and Ambo regional universities also
raised their voice. On Wednesday 8 June, street demonstrations by students,
high-school children, and street youths began in Addis Ababa. The govern-
ment gave orders to suppress it ‘at any cost’, and special armed units popu-
larly called the Ag‘azi (originally a special army division), consisting
predominantly of Tigrayan soldiers who, according to witnesses, could or
would not speak Amharic,36 did not communicate with protesters or bystand-
ers, and instantly acted aggressively to suppress any protest. About 46 people
— probably more — were killed, hundreds wounded, and more than 350
arrested. A high school near Mexico Square in the capital was emptied of its
protesting pupils who were carried off in army trucks. The government also
put opposition leaders under house arrest, harassed others, and started some
court cases and media campaigns against them.
Opposition parties and the ruling party had signed an EU-mediated pact
on 9 June to abide by the law, refrain from escalation, and appeal to the
NEBE to address complaints about voting irregularities. But this agree-
ment did not have a cooling effect and was not followed up. Distrust and
irritation grew, with the government showing no signs of compromise or
confidence building, and the opposition becoming more adamant in
demanding redress, no doubt overstating their case.
The opposition parties, especially the largest one, CUD, gave out
numerous press statements in the subsequent weeks, accusing the ruling
party of election fraud, stealing the victory and indiscriminate repression,
and demanded new elections. They also called for peaceful public protests.
But a big demonstration announced for 2 October 2005 on the central
Mäsqäl Square of Addis Ababa was cancelled because the indications were
that the government and its riot police would provoke violence, and people
might be killed in a massive confrontation.
Some observers spoke of a general tendency of ‘criminalizing’ opposition
members and sympathizers by government media. The demonstration of
the opposition on 2 October had been labelled by the government leaders
35. A first detailed report on the disturbances was Statement no. 84 (15 July 2005) of the
Ethiopian Human Rights Council (Addis Ababa).
36. The language predominantly spoken in the capital.
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as a ‘serious crime’, the opposition was repeatedly accused of ‘plotting to
overthrow the government’, and people in the possession of arms — even
guards of opposition party branch offices — were declared suspects.37
There was, however, no substance in the government allegations of any
armed rebellion prepared by opposition groups — the latter had no arms or
armed wing, and none of their statements could be interpreted as being a
call to the use of violence. Violent struggle was, however, proclaimed by
non-legal opposition groups like the OLF, OLNF, and some others, oper-
ating in peripheral areas (Ogaden, Gambela, Western Oromiya, and Afar)
and drawing support from discontented youngsters and local ethnic groups
affected by earlier state repression or neglect.
Observers and donors: international responses
The ‘international community’ — mainly the EU and United States — was
important not only as an invited observer at the 2005 elections but also as the
general environment or reference point, for the regime to take into account.
For economic and other reasons, Ethiopia wants to have good relations with
the donor community — and the regime kept up the rhetorical and policy
commitment to democratization and economic liberalization. There is nor-
mative pressure on aid-dependent governments in the developing world to
implement the agenda of internationally agreed democratic ideas, good gov-
ernance, rule-of-law principles, transparency, and accountability (also pro-
claimed by the United Nations). These concepts are not only ‘donor speak’
but are also widely shared by the ordinary population in those countries.
Some 300 international observers were present during the elections. The
most important observer reports were those from the EU and the United
States.38 But the African Union (AU) was also there. Its report39 was
rather insignificant, based on a very small sample of observers, and superfi-
cial. It did not reflect reality and was in line with the customary AU mild
responses to the abuse of power (as in the Zimbabwe case and the Darfur
issue). The AU did not seem overly concerned — despite its lack of criti-
cism on election flaws being against the letter and spirit of the NEPAD
peer review mechanism.
The EU delegation, however, gave a well-founded critical evaluation of
the elections, based on a principled and detailed analysis of the entire electoral
37. See ‘Ethiopia arrests 43 opposition members before rally’, Reuters, 26 September 2005
<http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L26392186.htm> (23 October 2005).
38. The other large powers in the world community — China and Russia — and Arab coun-
tries in the wider region kept quiet, in conformity with their lack of interest in the furthering
of democratic ideals and rule of law in the northeast African sub-region.
39. See AU Press release 45/2005 (of 10 August 2005), ‘Statement of the African Union on
the Ethiopian Legislative Elections held on Sunday’, 15 May 2005 <http://www.africa-
union.org/home/Welcome.htm>.
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process. Praise was given for the preliminary phase, the relatively free
debate and campaigning, the technical preparations, and the voting pro-
cess, but it was critical about the voting day practices and the selective
intimidation of voters and opposition candidates.40 EU observers did not
see the voting process in the large majority of the rural constituencies.
They nevertheless did a commendable job, showing that the EU took its
role of observer seriously. The response of Ethiopia’s prime minister to the
EU’s preliminary report (in the form of a very long letter to the state news-
paper Ethiopian Herald, 29–31 August 2005) was generally seen as dis-
proportionate and embarrassing, containing a blanket rejection of any
criticism and an ad hominem attack on the EU mission and its chairperson
Ms Ana Gomes, a Portuguese Euro-parliamentarian.
The US government response was also critical but did not reject the elec-
tion results outright.41 In a cautious, non-committal statement, it criticized
the ‘irregularities’ of the electoral process but called for peaceful negotia-
tions on the outstanding issues. Later, it urged the opposition parties to just
take up their seats in parliament. Although several observer groups from the
United States were allowed to attend the elections, three groups were sent
back in March.42 Only the Carter Center group remained. They gave a
statement on 15 September 2005.43 It concluded that: 
The elections process demonstrated significant advances in Ethiopia’s democratiza-
tion process, including most importantly the introduction of a more competitive elect-
oral process, which could potentially result in a pluralistic, multiparty political system.
Elsewhere: 
However, a considerable number of the constituency results based on the CRB and
CIP processes are problematic and lack credibility. Within the universe of seats
impacted by the complaints process, many of these cases lacked sufficient evidence to
warrant challenging the result. However, serious problems were found in parts of the
CRB [Complaints Review Board] process and in a considerable number of the CIPs
[Complaints Investigation Panels].44 In addition, there were problems in some of the
re-election constituencies.
40. This report (of 25 August 2005) is available at the website <http://www.et-eueom.org>
(20 October 2005).
41. State Department press statement, 1 September 2005. Also their press statement of
16 September 2005 <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53355.htm>. It said: ‘Because
reported election irregularities raised concerns about transparency, we will work with the
international community and the Ethiopian government and parties to strengthen the elect-
oral process’. But no results were achieved on this score.
42. These were the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican
Institute (IRI), and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), allegedly
‘operating illegally in the country’.
43. See <http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/2199.pdf>.
44. Both instituted ad hoc by the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia.
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So again, this was a mixed message satisfying both the ruling party and
the opposition views and was based on observation across the country on
only a limited scale (with 50 observers). Initial US government statements
did not show that in the context of their wider, and partly misconceived,
geo-political interests they took the Ethiopian political crisis very seriously,
but a more critical tone emerged in January 2006.
In the post-election controversies about the results and the complaints
process, the Ambassadors’ Donor Group and the EU (with delegation
head Timothy Clarke) actively tried to mediate between ruling party and
opposition.45 The United States and other countries appealed for calm and
for the opposition to enter the parliamentary process. On 20 June 2005, a
group of 13 prominent US members of Congress issued a letter to the
Ethiopian prime minister objecting to anti-demonstrator violence and urg-
ing restraint.46 The EU was active in attempting negotiated solutions but
lost patience with the heavy-handed approach of the government and the
intransigence of the opposition. On 13 October 2005, the European parlia-
ment gave out a press statement urging an end to government persecution
of the Ethiopian opposition and the release of the thousands of demonstra-
tors. The statement concluded with a call to step up humanitarian policy
and to possibly readjust the European Commission’s humanitarian aid to
Ethiopia.
It seemed that the Ethiopian government could no longer count on
unconditional support from the EU, although as usual the EU leadership
had been hesitant in May–June 2005 to support its field observer mission
reports and act on the recommendations. Behind the diplomatic façades,
however, the dissatisfaction with the current Ethiopian regime was sub-
stantial. In January 2006, Great Britain announced that it would cut all its
aid ($88 million) to the government.
Even the usually ‘non-political’ World Bank, which had been silent since
1991 because of reasonable formal economic growth rates of between
2 and 8 percent annually, gave warnings of possible aid reduction and a
refocusing of programmes. In a November 2005 interview, the Bank coun-
try representative in Ethiopia expressed doubts about the course that the
Ethiopian government was taking, hinting that it endangered governance,
stability, and macro-economic achievements so far.47 Although this World
Bank spokesman perhaps painted a somewhat too positive picture of the
actual economic progress achieved, his words nevertheless illustrated that,
45. See also the interview with Clarke in the Ethiopian weekly Capital, 15 November 2005,
expressing his dismay at the violent turn of events.
46. Posted on many websites, among them: <http://www.ethiopiafirst.com/news2005/Jan/
Congress-Letter-June20.pdf>. Although their concern was justified, this letter suffered from
some exaggeration and inaccuracies.
47. IRIN interview with Ishac Diwan, 18 November 2005 <http://www.irinnews.org/
report.asp?ReportID=50171&SelectRegion=Horn_of_Africa> (21 November 2005).
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even in the eyes of ‘non-political’ institutions, the turn towards authoritar-
ian politics was seriously at cross-purposes with equitable economic devel-
opment and enhancement of well-being (including poverty reduction) of
the population at large, things already felt by the Ethiopian masses for
several years.48 In December 2005, the donor consortium (EU and World
Bank, but not the US) announced it was withholding $374 million in
budget support to Ethiopia.
Authoritarian resurgence? The ‘business as usual’ approach of the government
The negotiations between the EPRDF government and opposition lead-
ers in October were inconclusive, court appeals were dragging on, and the
enmity increased, with aggressive and defiant exchanges between the
spokesmen of both sides.49 The CUD opposition increased the tension
with a series of statements on boycotts, preconditions for entry into parlia-
ment, and calls for re-elections, mass demonstrations, and stay-at-home
strikes; while the government added accusations against the opposition of
ethnic polarization, treason, illegal arms possession among opposition
members, and incitement to violence by the opposition.50 These latter
accusations lacked a credible basis in fact. True is that the opposition had
been showing increasing signs of intransigence and might have overesti-
mated its powers (cf. Joireman 1997 for a first study of the problems of the
opposition). Even though it might have close to a majority of the popula-
tion behind it, it was, in the current political conditions, not quite feasible
for the opposition parties UEDF and CUD to take over power.
The ruling party’s ignoring of the appeals of the opposition for recounts
or re-voting of all disputed constituencies (discussed above) may have been
the crucial mistake. A huge opportunity was lost, as so often in modern
Ethiopian history. If a quiet and credible reassessment, with observers and
transparent vote counting, of the contested constituencies would have been
made — and these surely would not all have gone to the opposition — then
the outbreak of protests, the boycotts, and the violent repression would
probably have been avoided. This reassessment would have been a face-
saving exercise that could have both enhanced the legitimacy of the
48. However, Ethiopia’s recent economic policies have not all been a dismal failure; there
were many new initiatives and significant GDP growth. See for an interesting opinion piece:
‘Our material poverty has little to do with the resistance against Meles & Co.’, by Bezuayehu
Kegerji (pseudonym), on a critical Ethiopian diaspora website <http://www.ethiomedia.com/
fastpress/message_to_our_donors.html> (15 November 2005).
49. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s interview of 25 September 2005 was marked by quite
bellicose language <http://www.waltainfo.com/EnNews/2005/Sep/25Sep05/Sep25e2.htm>
(24 October 2005).
50. See ‘Ethiopia: opposition party calls for consumer boycott’, IRIN (UN) <http://www.
irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=49872&SelectRegion=Horn_of_Africa&SelectCountry=
ETHIOPIA> (1 November 2005).
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government and enlarged the number of opposition seats. But the EPRDF
government, fearing the momentum of change, ignored all calls for further
negotiation or a government of national unity, convened the new parliament
on 5 October, and introduced the new ministerial team. Most opposition
members boycotted the parliament on that day, prompting the government
to lift their parliamentary immunity. Strictly speaking, this was unconstitu-
tional because this measure could only be taken when parliamentarians
committed crimes.
The opposition, in the face of government refusal, became more rigid in
its rejection of the legitimacy of the elections and was not prepared to enter
parliament, except for some CUD members, most of the UEDF, the two
smaller parties (13 seats), and one independent candidate. The opposition
faced a dilemma: sticking to principles — rejecting a seriously flawed elec-
tion — or compromising and at least securing some voice for the opposi-
tion in an EPRDF-dominated and -controlled parliament. Admittedly, the
ruling party — by its intimidating tactics and its changing parliamentary
rules, notably the new, higher quorum for bringing agenda items — had
made it difficult for opposition to have any influence. Since October 2005,
the two main opposition parties, CUD and UEDF, were also plagued by
internal divisions and could not formulate a coherent leadership or a uni-
fied policy. Ethiopian diaspora groups started expressing disappointment
with opposition tactics during the November crisis. An additional problem
was the use of ‘moles’, apparently by the government, to split the opposition
parties into two.51 This appears to have worked with the Oromo National
Congress (ONC), a part of the opposition UEDF party: the ONC leader
Merera Gudina was replaced by an unknown opponent, Tolossa Tesfaye,
after he was recognized by the NEBE and later by a court decision as the
legal chairman.52
The government thus moved from stalemate to ‘business as usual’,
ignoring public discontent and the need for compromise. It kept up repres-
sive measures on a massive scale, in the towns and especially in the coun-
tryside. Under the guise of maintaining public order, it also became bolder
in verbally attacking and physically harassing the opposition, especially the
51. This had also happened with the first pan-ethnic opposition movement, National Dem-
ocratic Union (NDU) in 1993–94, which only survived for a few years before withering away.
52. Despite a large majority of ONC MPs still supporting Dr Merera. See ‘A shake-up of
the ONC’, The Reporter <http://www.ethiopianreporter.com/modules.php?name=News&
file=article&sid=1113>. Cf. for the political background, the interview of ONC chairman
Merera Gudina with The Reporter <http://www.ethiopianreporter.com/modules.php?name=
News&file=article&sid=1132> (26 November 2005). The UEDF also had internal problems
because of the great role diaspora groups played in this party. For example, on 24 October
2005, the two UEDF leaders were ‘dismissed’ by the (diaspora-dominated) executive com-
mittee of their party because of the committee’s rejection of the decision to take up their seats
in the new, contested, Ethiopian parliament. To dismiss these two prestigious and at that
point indispensable leaders was a sign of immaturity.
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CUD and its presumed constituency. On 28 October 2005, security forces
surrounded and beat up a CUD leadership meeting, also harassing journal-
ists and two Dutch diplomats who came to the scene. On 31 October
2005, a peaceful car-honking protest was called, and it immediately led to
arrests and beatings of taxi drivers and other motorists by government
troops. This was probably the start of the new cycle of violence.
In subsequent weeks, starting 1 November, government forces acted to
suppress spreading popular protests in Addis Ababa, killing at least 40–50
people and wounding hundreds of others. In weeks of unrest elsewhere, for
example in provincial capitals and towns, dozens more demonstrators were
killed. A massive clampdown on the independent press and several civil
society organizations followed, with many journalists going into hiding.
The government equally accused journalists from the Amharic programmes
of the Voice of America and Deutsche Welle and, in January 2006, expelled
the British Associated Press (AP) correspondent. The top CUD leadership
was also arrested. In November–December 2005, government forces, in a
countrywide sweep also covering the rural areas,53 arrested an estimated 30
to 40,000 people, many of them taken in trucks to far-off prisons (Zeway
and Shewa-Robit) and remote, ill-equipped camps (Bir Sheleqo and
Didessa). By mid-January 2006, 11,200 people were released, but the
majority were still held, and reports about rampant abuse and deaths inside
these camps were too consistent to ignore.54 In December 2005, the govern-
ment charged the imprisoned CUD leadership and other people, including
former Ethiopians living in the diaspora in Europe and the United States,
with ‘treason’, a rather exaggerated and premature charge. It was later even
augmented with ‘genocide’.55 Although any credible evidence for such
charges was lacking, those in custody were repeatedly denied bail by the
court. The people arrested included respected lawyers, academics, NGO
people, and other public figures. The repressive approach followed was
further evidence of the assault on civil society and on the emerging, non-
party allied middle class as represented notably by the CUD. But it was a
risky policy of over-reaction, which far from restoring order and authority
continued to lose the government party support both domestically and
internationally. It was the start of a longer phase of tension and instability.
Not to be neglected are the psychological effects of the crisis: malaise, fear,
53. See Human Rights Watch statement, ‘Ethiopia: hidden crackdown in rural areas’, 13
January 2006.
54. See ‘Democratic dawn in Ethiopia fades as abuses come to light’, The Observer,
4 December 2005. Cf. also the documentary on Britain’s Channel 4 of November 2005
<http://www.channel4.com/player/playerwindow.html?id=1310&vert=news> (28 December
2005). Information from two former prisoners (Addis Ababa, 30 January 2006) from Didessa
revealed that many prisoners had died because of disease and snakebites, whereas others were
killed by hyenas and lions after escaping.
55. See ‘Ethiopia charges opposition members with genocide’, Reuters, 21 December 2005
<http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L2111222.htm> (25 December 2005).
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and cynicism among the public, perceiving politics again as dangerous
business and as a closed elite affair.56 This included the deep shock about
the police and army people prepared to use indiscriminate force against
their countrymen. Trust in the political process and system of governance
thus reached its lowest ebb. Notable since December 2005 is the involve-
ment of high-school pupils, staging symbolic protests like coming to school
dressed in black or boycotting examinations.57 The response to protests
since November 2005 revealed the insecurity of the regime, and the extent
of discontent beneath the surface. The discontent has now been aug-
mented by the public’s memory of the excessive nature of the violence used
to suppress public demonstrations and opposition activity.58 But this situ-
ation, which now has continued for about a year, will not necessarily lead
to a change of regime.
Democratization: the enduring constraints
An empirical study of the 2005 Ethiopian electoral process shows that
indeed great strides were made towards a new democratic process. But the
elections evidenced some serious flaws, especially in the counting stage,
and probably did not reflect the preference of the people under free-and-
fair conditions. A balanced treatment of the complaints about contested
constituencies in May–June 2005 and fair re-voting would have made all
the difference.
A more general conclusion is that Ethiopian political culture is not yet
free from its historical heritage of authoritarianism, elite rule, and patron-
age and that in this context a change of government and the ousting of the
reigning party stand small chance in post-1991 Ethiopia. The political sys-
tem has been reconstituted anew as one of neo-patrimonial governance
reverting to old modes and techniques of control and an ideology of power
as a commodity possessed by a new elite at the centre. The old grid of
autocratic governance was resurrected, the system reproducing the limita-
tions to democratic, consultative government and due electoral process.
56. One journalist said: ‘We feel betrayed by democracy (...). It is as if the government
encouraged us to speak our minds so that it would know who to grab when the time came’.
Cited in M. Odenheimer, ‘A dream defiled — the betrayal of Ethiopia’s democracy’, Washington
Post, 17 December 2005.
57. Police responded by beating and arresting the pupils and issuing warnings against teach-
ers and parents.
58. Also victimizing elderly women, mothers, and children. The government, however,
announced an ‘independent inquiry’ on the violence [see ‘Resolve to set up Independent
Inquiry Commission part of efforts to ensure the rule of law – Ministry’, Ethiopian Herald,
19 November 2005 <http://allafrica.com/stories/200511210142.html>]. Previous inquiry com-
missions on violent incidents rarely led to prosecution or conviction of any security force
members or government officials.
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Other complicating factors, related to Ethiopia’s ethno-regional diversity
and the politics of division, add their weight to the post-election crisis. I
mention two examples, based on recent incidents. In June 2005, some
2,000 people of Amhara descent were chased out from the Gida-Kiramo
district in Eastern Wollega (Oromia region) by local people, accused of
being ‘CUD opposition supporters’.59 Local ruling party members and
cadres reportedly incited the people, and the police did not act to stop the
expulsion. The victims had built up a life there since the 1960s and had
intermarried in the community. But they had to leave under threat and
abandon all their possessions. This event is an ominous sign that the political
conflicts in Ethiopia are being ethnicized: to be an ‘Amhara’ brands one as
supporter of the CUD and to be a supporter of CUD or another opposition
party brands one as suspect in the eyes of the ruling party or its loyalists.60
CUD has prominent leaders from the Amhara-speaking population and
happens to have a large following in the Amhara, Gurage, and some other
areas, but does not have an ‘ethnic programme’, unless its aim to event-
ually rescind Article 39.1 of the Ethiopian constitution (which allows the
secession of ethnic groups or ‘nationalities’) is seen as such. The ruling
party supporters seem to want people to believe that the CUD party has
one, and indeed, many ordinary people are persuaded by this discourse. As
a result, the lives of innocents, seen as imaginary opponents, are destroyed.
Although ethnic tensions exist, it bodes ill for intergroup relations and for
the continued existence of the Ethiopian political order to make ethnic dif-
ferences an issue in politics. The current government has done a lot to
make ethnicity the discourse of politics in Ethiopia — perhaps with the
good intention of giving rights to ethnic groups. The opposition parties,
although drawing support more from certain ethnic groups than from oth-
ers (but very little from the Tigrayans), have no ethnic agenda per se, and
the election debates were not about this. Opposition parties did not deny
ethno-regional and cultural rights, but aimed at more unified national and
equitable policies. If they would have pursued an ethnic agenda, then divi-
sions would have been even greater, with explosive consequences.
Another telling incident occurred in November 2005 and concerned
violent confrontation between local Muslims and Orthodox Christians
(Amhara, Oromo, and Gurage) in the town of Kore in southern Ethiopia.
The Christians were for some reason all identified with the CUD opposi-
tion and apparently attacked and put to flight by Muslim residents,
59. See the message ‘Kä 2000 bälay yäQinijjit Dägafiwoch Täsaddädu’ (‘More than 2,000
CUD supporters were made refugees’) <http://www.mahder.com/index.php?name=amharic>
(21 October 2005) in Amharic.
60. The same mechanism was seen in earlier confrontations of government loyalist-activists
with Oromo people claiming rights and usually declared to be ‘OLF (the banned Oromo Lib-
eration Front) supporters’.
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agitated by unknown forces.61 This is a major crime and a very worrisome
indication that people are starting to use religion as a pretext for political
violence. The consequences of such an approach will be disastrous for
Ethiopia, where religion is usually kept out of politics, certainly on the
local, community level. Such incidents reveal deep problems in Ethiopian
politics, where elites are not averse to resorting to divide-and-rule tactics to
maintain power.
The current democratization process is structurally and ideologically
limited in that it is too closely supervised by the party in power, which — a
fact often forgotten — is one advocating ‘revolutionary democracy’, not
liberal democracy.62 Revolutionary democracy aims at the collective mobi-
lization of the people, led from above by the party. It derives from a combi-
nation of Marxist and ethno-regional ideology and has no negotiated,
evolutionary basis in Ethiopia. It was functional in the anti-Derg guerrilla
struggle, but after the TPLF–EPRDF victory in 1991, it was imposed
nationwide by default. It envisages the party as a vanguard political force,
which is not inclined to compromise with opposition forces because it is
convinced that it has the solution for everything. In the current system,
multiparty elections thus do not appear to fundamentally threaten the
existing power structure: the party-dominated executive branch of govern-
ment (controlling the economy, the army, and the security forces) always
retains strict control. Van de Walle’s remark that: ‘. . . the multiparty sys-
tem is being constructed in such a way that it does not threaten that con-
trol’ also holds in Ethiopia.63 But, as events in the post-election period
suggest, perhaps more than in other African countries today, the executive
in Ethiopia is prepared to use coercive force to prevent change. In a prac-
tical sense, it thus seems that Ethiopian voters will have great difficulty in
ever voting the existing government out of office, unless the ruling party
succumbs to internal tensions (as it almost did in 2001),64 or when the
perceived socio-political damage — domestic instability and external,
donor-country pressure — becomes too great, or, finally, when it converts
to democratic dialogue and develops an inclusive agenda geared to the
national interest (the promise that the regime held out in the early years).
61. News item on the website <http://ethiopianreview.homestead.com> (28 November
2005). It could not immediately be checked against other sources.
62. In 2001, the Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi stated in an ideological discus-
sion piece for his party (‘Basic questions of democracy in Ethiopia’) that ‘liberal democracy’
is not possible in Ethiopia. See The Reporter (Amharic magazine) 4, 36 (May 2001). Later in
2001, an ideological document in Amharic was produced, called ‘Revolutionary Democ-
racy’ (cf. note 6), outlining the ruling party’s future strategy. Western embassies had (parts
of) it translated, but how it changed their view on Ethiopian politics as a result of reading it
is not clear.
63. N. Van de Walle, ‘Presidentialism and clientelism in Africa’s emerging party systems’,
Journal of Modern African Studies 42, 2 (2003), p. 315.
64. See the interesting analysis by Paulos Milkias, ‘The great purge and ideological paradox
in contemporary Ethiopian politics’, Horn of Africa 19, 1–4 (2001), pp. 1–99.
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The option for the latter is still there, and if taken, the current regime
would enhance its historic prestige and acceptance in one blow.
Conclusion: revisiting the neo-patrimonial model
Looking back on 15 years of political reform, one notes that the democ-
ratization process has not resulted — perhaps cannot — in the political
institutionalization of democracy. The resurrected neo-patrimonialist
regime prevents this. Power is not sufficiently transparent, and a demo-
cratic polity, including a well-functioning and independent judiciary,
acceptable to the wider public and that would survive the change of per-
sonnel, was not achieved. Ethiopia has a well-entrenched political machine
dominated by a party that is not ready to let go of power — the stakes are
simply too high. The party elite has dominated government policy since
1991, and a real option of elections resulting in government change is not
yet available. In this, Ethiopian politics, although in a more coercive ver-
sion, resembles that of many other African (post-colonial) states.
Although the neo-patrimonial approach provides an essential start to
explain Ethiopian (African) politics, it nevertheless can be granted that the
critiques of this theory have a point: it is a model that, although necessary,
is not sufficient in explaining African political systems. There are addi-
tional factors,65 such as the force of ideology, the inherited tradition of
‘state capacity’, the existence of professionalism in the bureaucracy and the
civil service, and last but not least donor-country pressures and demands.
In the Ethiopian case, these four elements are clearly present: there is a
strong vanguard party ideology leading the political elite, and there are
notable standards of professionalism in the bureaucratic institutions and a
residual idea of state responsibility and intervention for the common
good.66 The role of donor-country political and financial support in keep-
ing the government in place is also significant (although in the end the
Ethiopian government treats the donors with indifference and ignored their
calls for moderation and mediation). But I would argue that even in the
relatively exceptional case of Ethiopia, the logic that subsumes these ele-
ments mentioned above is that of neo-patrimonial rule — the country and
its politics are treated as the privileged domain of power holders who oper-
ate in an informal and often non-transparent manner, and over which the
formal institutions do not have a decisive say. Changes in the formal
institutional sphere (parliamentary votes or elections), or independent
65. O. Therkildsen, ‘Understanding public management through neo-patrimonialism: a
paradigm for all African seasons?’, in U. Engel and G.R. Olsen (eds), The African Exception
(Ashgate, Aldershot, 2005), pp. 49–50.
66. Most members of which indeed resisted the party loyalist principles and crony appoint-
ments that the leading party tried to introduce after 1991.
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operation of the judiciary, are not ‘allowed’ in current conditions if the
existing power network is threatened.
Another criticism of neo-patrimonialist approaches, is that underlining a
point made by Hansen in a recent study of Cameroon, they do not suffi-
ciently take into account ‘. . . the use of force and the recourse to coercion’,
that is, the use of violence that political actors/systems in Africa — and simi-
lar systems elsewhere — are prepared to take.67 Coercive force is a neces-
sary if not central ingredient of many political systems with contested
legitimacy. Political culture in Ethiopia suffers under the historic burden of
violence used as a political means, still recognizable today, in both rhetoric
and practice.68 This reflects a general problematic in countries with institu-
tional and economic resource scarcity and zero-sum game politics, where
conceptions of power are unitary and the idea of a loyal opposition has not
taken root.
In current conditions in Ethiopia, the ruling elite, for various reasons,
cannot envisage or permit a division of powers and is endangering a con-
tinuation of the democratization process. It might also be argued that a
complex and divided country like Ethiopia ‘needs’ a strong or authoritarian
regime. But the question is whether the course taken is a durable one, or
whether the government would stand a better chance by returning to the
road of democratizing the polity. This latter possibility is still there,
although increasingly unlikely: the regime has become entrenched to the
extent that power, ideology, and material interests have coagulated into a
structure that inhibits democratization. From events so far, one can con-
clude that the consultation and inclusion of citizens, the ‘broad masses’, is
neglected, if not considered irrelevant, in view of the vanguard role of the
dominant party and the intricate political-economic power structure now
established. As noted above, the distance between the rulers and the ruled
has increased to remarkable proportions. In the campaign of ‘restoring law
and order’ since early November 2005, all public protests were suppressed
with violent means and mass arrest of supposed opponents and opposition,
and also Ethiopian civil society organizations and information sources were
tackled. Several (like the Mäcca-Tuläma Association among the Oromo
people) had already been proscribed before, but since November, the asso-
ciation of free press journalists69 and a number of local NGOs were also
threatened, another indication of the turn towards the centralist control of
civic space. Following Gill’s theory, this clampdown on civil society will
seriously retard a transition to democratic politics.70
67. Hansen, ‘The politics of personal relations’, p. 222.
68. Cf. J. Abbink, ‘Transformations of violence in twentieth-century Ethiopia: cultural
roots, political conjunctures’, Focaal. Tijdschrift voor Antropologie 25, (1995), pp. 57–77.
69. By January 2006, all independent newspapers had stopped appearing.
70. Gill, Dynamics of Democratization.
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Compared to other African countries, Ethiopia has a relatively strong
state, inherited from Emperor Haile Sellassie and currently expanded with
a large security apparatus, and a popular revolution leading to regime
change is not likely at this point. But most observers, including donor-
country representatives, have now come to conclude that, in simple objec-
tive terms, the position of the incumbent government is seriously weak-
ened despite its re-establishing some kind of order. There is no going back
to things as they were before May 2005. Not only is the government’s
political legitimacy seriously at issue, but it is also engendering contradic-
tions between governance and socio-economic development. Development
would benefit from middle-class dynamics, legal security of property,
transparency of policy, and social mobility. Ignoring these contradictions
and the profound desire for change among the Ethiopian public might pre-
vent it from actually carrying out many of its political and economic pro-
grammes. It could also generate sustained protest, growing insecurity, and
durable instability, undermining a government’s functioning and even
endangering the basis of neo-patrimonial rule. The fact that, again, there
are violent succession problems in the Ethiopian political system — already
known in the time of the Zagwe dynasty (eleventh to thirteenth century) —
underlines the remarkable but tragic continuity of Ethiopian history.
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